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ABSTRACT
This article aims at identifying the individual and joint impact of two « country-level variables », namely national 
distance and country risk, on the survival of international joint ventures in emerging countries. Research 
hypotheses predicting the negative impact of national distance and country risk on survival are formulated in 
this article. These research hypotheses are tested in a sample of 165 international joint ventures that were formed 
in Brazil between 1974 and 2003. These joint ventures were subjected to an event history analysis over a period 
of time ranging from 1974 to 2005. The empirical results show that the intercultural dynamics increases the 
instability of international joint ventures whereas the survival of these alliances does not seem to be affected by 
the economic and political uncertainty of Brazil. Furthermore, the national distance between local and foreign 
partners has effects on survival that are variable according to the life cycle of international joint ventures.
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SEÇÃO INTERNACIONAL
1 INTRODUCTION
During the early years of the Soviet Union, in Novem-
ber 1922, at the end of the civil war and in a context of ma-
jor economic crisis, Lenin approved the formation of mixed 
capital fi rms (combining State/private and foreign/Soviet 
capital). They were the fi rst ever international joint ven-
tures (IJVs), which are organizational entities created and 
managed jointly by foreign and local fi rms. Thanks to this 
new form of collaborative organization, some US oil fi rms 
– namely, Chevron Oil, Socony and Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, which resulted from the dismantling of the Standard 
Oil Trust – were able to exploit oilfi elds in the region of 
Baku and the Caspian Sea in association with Soviet State 
companies.
Later, in other parts of the world, IJVs were to prove 
their usefulness as a mode of entry for foreign fi rms. IJVs 
multiplied and contributed to the internationalization of 
many US, European and Japanese fi rms. This central role 
of the IJV in the internationalization strategy of fi rms, 
particularly multinationals, was identifi ed and stressed by 
Franko (1971) in his book, Joint Venture Survival in Mul-
tinational Corporations. However, since 1971, the purpo-
ses of IJVs have widened considerably, to the point where 
their initial main objective has become secondary in rela-
tion to objective such as economies of scale and size effect 
(HENNART, 1988, KOGUT, 1988, GARRETTE; DUSSAUGE, 
1995), competence learning and transfer (HAMEL et al., 
1989, HAMEL, 1991), or business refocusing and restruc-
turing (NANDA; WILLIAMSON, 1995). At the same time, 
the opening up of new geographic markets accelerated, the 
WTO was set up, and the favorable regulations for foreign 
direct investment were introduced widely in different coun-
tries. These developments motivated the multinationals 
to replace the IJV by other entry modes, such as wholly-
owned subsidiaries and acquisitions, which ensured them 
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total, not shared, control of international operations and 
resources. These two combined movements led to a slow 
but inevitable decline of IJV as a mode of entry.
In the late 1990s, however, IJVs developed on a large 
scale again. The spectacular growth of the BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) and emerging countries in 
general gave new momentum to IJVs. It is the political and 
economic uncertainty and the cultural specifi city of these 
countries that made IJVs so popular among foreign fi rms. 
US, European and Japanese fi rms tend to privilege IJV as a 
mode of entry whenever the country risk and the national 
cultural distance – known as “country-level variables” (KO-
GUT; SINGH, 1988) – are high and diffi cult to manage.
By collaborating through an IJV with a local partner 
in the emerging country, the foreign fi rm protects itself 
against the negative impact of these variables. It is the 
IJJV’s very structure, and more particularly the natu-
re and complementarity of each partner’s contributions, 
that make it so attractive. The foreign partner provides the 
IJV with upstream resources such as brands, fi nance and 
production technology (CONNOLLY, 1984, PAN, 1996). 
The local partner provides downstream resources such as 
awareness of local markets, access to distribution chan-
nels, personnel (INKPEN; BEAMISH, 1997, KALE; ANAND, 
2001), knowledge of local regulations and preferential 
access to the State authorities (KALE;  ANAND, 2001). 
Thanks to its IJV with a local fi rm, the foreign fi rm does 
not deal directly with the emerging country’s market, dis-
tribution networks, regulations and political stakeholders. 
It is the local partner who deals with them. Thus, the IJV 
allows the foreign partner to reduce its “liability of foreign-
ness” (HYMER, 1976, ZAHEER; MOSAKOWSKI, 1997, RO-
DRIGUEZ et al., 2005). The IJV is also a source of learning 
for the foreign partner, who takes advantage of the period 
of collaboration to observe the local partner’s modus ope-
randi and to transfer its downstream resources and market 
knowledge. Apart from the learning outcomes, a foreign 
fi rm involved in an IJV benefi ts from a legitimation process 
on the part of the local consumers and political stakehol-
ders (SCOTT, 1995, ZAHEER; MOSAKOWSKI, 1997) and 
gradually acquires the status of a “quasi-local player.”
While the IJV is a favorite mode of entry into emerging 
countries, its concrete outcomes do not live up to its pro-
mise and its potential advantages. Empirical studies of IJV 
survival in emerging countries show that between 30 and 
50% are sold off, bought out or dissolved by the partners 
in the fi rst fi ve years (LEE; BEAMISH, 1995, PAN, 1996, 
LEUNG, 1997, YAN, 1998; KALE; ANAND, 2001, MESCHI, 
2005). Some studies have linked this high instability to the 
specifi c nature of country-level variables of emerging coun-
tries, namely, high country risk and strong national cultural 
differences: “for IJVs formed in developing or transforming 
economies, the turbulent political and economic environ-
ments together with the intercultural and interorganizational 
dynamics have made managing international joint ventures 
particularly challenging” (YAN, 1998:773). Therefore there 
is a paradox inherent to IJVs formed in emerging countries: 
the two country-level variables – country risk and national 
distance – which lead to the formation of IJVs in emerging 
countries are also those that cause their dissolution.
However, empirical studies of the impact of country risk 
and national cultural differences on IJV survival have produ-
ced inconclusive results. Furthermore, the impact of these va-
riables on survival has been only examined individually, and 
not jointly. The aim of this article is to perform an in-depth 
study of the relationship between these country-level varia-
bles, taken individually and in interaction, and the survival of 
IJVs. More precisely, this article aims to answer the following 
questions: what is the impact of country risk and national 
cultural differences between local and foreign partners on the 
survival of IJVs? Is country risk a moderating variable, or does 
it amplify the impact of national cultural differences on the 
survival of IJVs? Does the longevity of IJVs affect the impact of 
national cultural differences on survival?
This article is organized in four parts as follows: in the 
fi rst part, we will defi ne and combine the concepts of cul-
tural distance, country risk and IJV survival. Building on 
the theoretical frameworks of the culturalist approach (for 
analyzing the impact of national cultural differences) and 
environmental selection (for analyzing the impact of coun-
try risk) we will formulate research hypotheses. In the se-
cond part, we will detail the data collection, the variables, 
and the sample of 165 IJVs formed in Brazil between 1974 
and 2003. These IJVs were subjected to an event history 
analysis over a period of time ranging from 1974 to 2005. 
In the third part, we will test the research hypotheses and 
discuss the results. In the conclusion, we will sum up the 
main fi ndings and present the limitations and the future 
directions of this research.
2 CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTNERS, COUNTRY RISK AND SURVIVAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN EMERGING COUNTRIES: THEORETICAL 
APPROACHES AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Conceived as a distinct organization in it own right, 
but managed jointly by the local and foreign partners, the 
IJV is by its very nature full of tensions. These tensions are 
omnipresent in the IJV. They are caused by the partners’ 
behavior and its changes over time. There are tensions 
because the partners wave between convergence and di-
vergence of objectives, between the will to share and the 
will to dominate IJV management, between circulation 
and retention of information and knowledge, and between 
loyalty and opportunism. These tensions are inherent to 
a jointly managed organization, but they can degenerate 
into confl icts and lead to dissolution of the IJV. As noted 
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by Schaan (1988), management of an IJV is a “subtle balan-
ce.” It incurs high governance and transaction costs that 
can become unbearable for the partners if these tensions 
exacerbate.
Research literature on IJVs highlighted different varia-
bles that may increase or moderate these tensions. Among 
these variables, there are three main groups: specifi c va-
riables to the industry (growth rate of demand, degree 
of concentration, intensity of competition, entry barriers 
etc.), specifi c variables to the partners’ assets and resour-
ces (experience, size, degree of internationalization, repu-
tation etc.), and country-level variables (national distan-
ce, country risk, corruption etc.). In the particular case of 
country-level variables, empirical studies that examined 
the relationship between these variables and IJV survival 
obtained inconclusive results. As regards national cultu-
ral differences between partners, some empirical studies 
observed a negative impact on survival (LI; GUISINGER, 
1991, BARKEMA; VERMEULEN, 1997, HENNART; ZENG, 
2002), others a positive impact (PARK; UNGSON, 1997, 
POTHUKUCHI et al., 2002), and others found no signi-
fi cant impact (FEY; BEAMISH, 2001). As regards country 
risk, empirical studies are more scarce, but the conclusions 
are still mixed: Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) observed no 
signifi cant relation between country risk and IJV survival, 
whereas Meschi (2005) showed that, in emerging coun-
tries with high economic and political uncertainty, there 
was a signifi cant increase in the probability of termination 
of IJVs over time.
What of the tensions inherent to the IJV when it ope-
rates in a country with high economic and political un-
certainty and where there are marked cultural specifi cities? 
This link must be re-examined in the setting of emerging 
countries where country-level variables have very special 
importance. It must be studied in greater depth by exa-
mining not only the individual impact of national distance 
and country risk, but also the joint impact of these varia-
bles on IJV survival.
In forming an IJV, the partners will transfer to it the 
fi nancial, technological and commercial resources and as-
sets that are required for its operation. Apart from these 
tangible contributions, the partners bring to the IJV the 
national habits, beliefs and values that characterize their 
respective home countries. These national habits, beliefs 
and values correspond to a national culture that constitu-
tes a “software of the mind” (HOFSTEDE, 1980 and 1997) 
and “the invisible force behind the tangibles and observable 
in any organization” (KILMANN et al., 1985:2). The IJV’s 
employees, whether they are expatriates or locals, bring 
with them this national culture that shapes their behavior 
at work. Thus, any IJV is characterized by national cultu-
ral differences whose intensity depends on the degree of 
congruence or divergence between the partners’ national 
cultures. If the national cultures involved are distinct and 
do not fi t well, then the national cultural differences will 
be strong and may create a cultural collision that is detri-
mental to the IJV. In other words, the performance and, 
more generally, the survival of IJVs are determined by the 
intensity of national cultural differences between the local 
and foreign partners. This reasoning is consistent with the 
culturalist approach that relates the (good or bad) func-
tioning of organizations to cultural and cross-cultural fac-
tors (HOFSTEDE, 1980 and 1997, CAMERON; FREEMAN, 
1988, SCHNEIDER, 1989). This theoretical approach has 
been greatly developed in the setting of international ac-
quisitions (NAHAVANDI; MALEKZADEH, 1988, BUONO; 
BOWDITCH, 1989) and IJVs (LI; GUISINGER, 1991, PARK; 
UNGSON, 1997, BARKEMA; VERMEULEN, 1997, MESCHI, 
1997, FEY; BEAMISH, 2001, HENNART; ZENG, 2002, PO-
THUKUCHI et al., 2002). Building on this theoretical ap-
proach, we can formulate a fi rst research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the national cultural di-
fferences between local and foreign partners, the lower 
the probability of survival of IJVs in emerging coun-
tries, and conversely.
Like any organization, an IJV is faced with the “liabili-
ty of newness” during its fi rst few years of existence. This 
concept is derived from the theory of population ecology of 
organizations (HANNAN; FREEMAN, 1977, CAROLL; DE-
LACROIX, 1982, FREEMAN et al., 1983). It translates into 
a mortality rate of organizations that is high immediately 
after their creation and then decreases gradually over time. 
Many reasons are put forward to explain this phenomenon, 
most notably the young organization’s low degree of ins-
titutionalization (both internal and external). When they 
are fi rst created, and during their early years, young organi-
zations lack internal institutionalization, namely, standar-
dized managerial procedures and routines that are shared 
and well accepted by all the personnel. And they also lack 
external institutionalization, namely, external recognition 
and ties with the environment’s key stakeholders.
Liability of newness combined with strong national 
cultural differences between partners makes young IJVs 
particularly unstable. The initial lack of managerial proce-
dures and routines is critical for an IJV that faces cultural 
tensions. During its early years, the IJV does not have any 
ready-made procedures and routines for resolving confl icts 
and it does not have enough experience of cross-cultural 
management. When the IJV gets older, it develops speci-
fi c procedures and routines for cross-cultural management 
and it is suffi ciently experienced to handle and absorb cul-
tural confl icts. As shown by some empirical studies (BEA-
MISH, 1988, MESCHI, 1997, HENNART; ZENG, 2002), the 
IJV stability depends on its age or longevity. This leads us 
to propose a second research hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: In emerging countries, the longevity 
of IJVs moderates the negative impact of national cul-
tural differences on the probability of survival of these 
organizational entities.
Just like national distance, country risk is a factor of 
IJV destabilization. If the country risk deteriorates, the IJV 
must face increasing environmental uncertainty that can 
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alter the subtle, often precarious balance of the relations 
and tensions between partners. In the end, it is the IJV’s 
very survival that may be affected. The notion that environ-
mental uncertainty is a critical factor to organization sur-
vival has been put forward by the theoretical approach of 
environmental selection. Initially developed from theories of 
population ecology of organizations (HANNAN; FREEMAN, 
1977, CAROLL; DELACROIX, 1982) and industrial organi-
zation (BAIN, 1956, SCHERER, 1980, PORTER, 1980), this 
approach considers the environment as a “force” that do-
minates the fi rm and determines its performance or even 
its survival.
From an economic point of view, an increase in envi-
ronmental uncertainty is caused by government default on 
payments, a devaluation of the local currency and/or an 
increase in interest rates. These are macroeconomic factors 
that have a negative impact on demand and consumption 
in the emerging country. Therefore economic uncertainty 
is detrimental to the sales and fi nancial results of local fi r-
ms and IJVs that operate in the emerging country. From a 
political point of view, an increase in environmental un-
certainty can be related to the enforcement of restrictive 
regulations to hinder foreign direct investment (expropria-
tion, nationalization, restrictions on repatriation of profi ts, 
discriminatory taxes etc.) and/or government instability 
(weakening of the State, instability of political institutions, 
State corruption, coup d’état, unrest, riots, strikes etc.). In 
all cases, an increase in economic and political uncertainty 
leads to a change in fi nancial results, objectives and bar-
gaining power of local and foreign partners.
The deterioration of country risk nullifi es the initial 
agreement between the partners (on their contributions 
and profi t sharing), which has to be completely renegotia-
ted. However, it is often diffi cult to renegotiate the agre-
ement because the partners do not agree to modify their 
position and role within the IJV. Renegotiation is all the 
more diffi cult if there are strong national cultural differen-
ces between partners who do not manage to understand 
each other and communicate effectively. As a consequence 
the IJV cannot adjust to the new environmental conditions, 
and its survival is at stake. The following hypotheses may 
be formulated on the basis of the previous developments 
and the theoretical approach of environmental selection:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the country risk, the 
lower the probability of survival of IJVs in emerging 
countries, and conversely.
Hypothesis 4: Country risk amplifi es the negative 
impact of national cultural differences on the probabili-
ty of survival of IJVs in emerging countries.
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: SAMPLE, EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS AND VARIABLES
This article is based on a sample of 165 international 
joint ventures that were formed in Brazil between 1974 
and 2003. This sample was collected from LexisNexis and 
Factiva databases and data provided by the Brazilian Mi-
nistry of Development, Industry and Commerce (Ministério 
do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio). It only includes 
large IJVs (namely, those for which the contract amount 
exceeded $US50 million) that involved at least two part-
ners, a Brazilian one and foreign one. The IJVs of the sam-
ple only include foreign partners from developed countries 
(see Table 1 ).
In this article, the unit of analysis is the IJV. Every 
IJV in the sample was examined through a longitudinal 
analysis between 1974 and 2005. Thus the status – ter-
mination or survival – of the 165 IJVs was followed-up 
from their date of creation to the end of the period at risk 
in 2005. Drawing on the event history analysis, we iden-
tifi ed the joint ventures that were still active at the end 
of the period at risk – namely, the censored IJVs – and 
those that were dissolved, sold off or bought out before 
the end of the period at risk – namely, the non-censored 
IJVs –. This longitudinal analysis was performed by a re-
search team at the Faculdade de Economia, Administração 
e Contabilidade (FEA) of the Universidade de São Paulo 
(USP), which contacted each IJV by telephone. If the IJV 
had been terminated or could not be contacted, then the 
team contacted some representatives of the IJV’s Brazi-
lian partner.
A total of 83 IJVs were dissolved, sold off or bought 
out before the end of the period at risk (50.3% of the sam-
ple). Tables 2  and 3  respectively present the forms and 
the reasons for termination of these 83 IJVs.
Figure 1  presents the survival curve of IJVs formed 
in Brazil between 1974 and 2003. More precisely, Figure 1 
details, year by year for the entire period at risk, the rate of 
survival of the IJVs in the sample.
A measurement of IJV survival was used as a depen-
dent variable. This survival variable was measured by bi-
nary coding (0, 1): the value 0 was given to IJVs that were 
still active at the end of the period at risk (in 2005), and 
the value 1 was given to IJVs that were terminated befo-
re 2005. A simple survival model (without specifying its 
parametric form) was used to successively estimate a ha-
zard rate of the different IJVs in the sample (KALBFLEISCH; 
PRENTICE, 1980, ALLISON, 1984).
 h(t) or hazard function = λ
t
 
 where t = 1, 2, , …, T and  0 < λ
t
 < 1
λt is the hazard rate corresponding to the time interval t 
within the period at risk. The hazard rate is the converse 
of the survival rate. The hazard rate is defi ned as “the pro-
bability that an individual would experience an event in an 
interval from time t to t+s, given that the individual is at risk 
from time t” (ALLISON, 1984: 23). Therefore the sequence 
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 Table 1  Breakdown of joint ventures by country of origin of foreign partners
Country of origin a Joint Ventures %
USA  75  45.5
Japan  13   7.9
Italy  12   7.3
Germany  12   7.3
Great-Britain  11   6.7
France   9   5.5
The Netherlands   7   4.2
Spain   5   3.0
Norway   5   3.0
Canada   5   3.0
Belgium   3   1.8
Switzerland   3   1.8
Sweden   2   1.2
Finland   2   1.2
Austria   1   0.6
Total 165 100.0
a When more than one foreign partner is present in the joint venture, we only reported in
this table the country of origin of the foreign partner with the largest equity stake.
 Table 2  Descriptive statistics of the forms of joint venture termination
Forms Joint Ventures %
Dissolution 20  24.1
Acquisition by the foreign partner 30  36.1
Sell-off to the local partner 15  18.1
Sell-off to a third party 18  21.7
Total 83 100.0
 Table 3  Descriptive statistics of the reasons for joint venture termination
Reasons Joint Ventures %
Failure a 25  30.1
Expansion of one of the partner 23  27.7
Refocusing of one of the partner 19  22.9
Debt reduction of one of the partner 6   7.2
Miscelleanous 10  12.1
Total 83 100.0
a Joint ventures are classifi ed as failure when they are terminated following confl icts
between partners, fi nancial losses and/or low operating and fi nancial performance.
from λ1 to λt corresponds to the annual variation in the 
probability of termination for a given IJV.
The impact of the independent variables and control 
variables on hazard rate was tested with a Cox proportio-
nal hazards model (1972).
 h(t) or hazard function = exp(βX
t
)λ
t
Xt is the vector of the independent variables and control 
variables at the time interval t within the period at risk and 
â is the vector of the regression coeffi cients.
Two independent variables – national cultural differences 
between partners and country risk – were introduced into 
this regression model to test the four research hypotheses. 
As regards national cultural differences between Brazil and 
the home country of the foreign partners, we used the in-
dex of cultural distance defi ned by Kogut and Singh (1988). 
This is a composite index based on the deviation along each 
of the Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions (power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and indivi-
dualism). The following formula was used to calculate the 
index of cultural distance (KOGUT; SINGH, 1988: 422):
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 Figure 1  Survival curve of international joint ventures in Brazil
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CDj = Σ {(Iij – Iib)2/ Vi }/4i=1
4
Iij is the distance index for the i
th cultural dimension and 
jth country, Vi is the variance of the index of i
th cultural 
dimension, b stands for Brazil, and CDj corresponds to the 
cultural distance between the jth country and Brazil. Table 
4  presents the descriptive statistics of the index of cul-
tural distance within the sample.
As regards country risk, two scores were calculated: 
one for economic risk and one for political risk. Each score 
is positioned on a scale ranging from 0 (no risk) to 1 (ma-
ximum risk). The scores for economic risk and political risk 
are taken from the IRIS database. Each of these scores cor-
responds to a weighted average of several indicators. In the 
case of economic risk, the main indicators are the risk of 
government default on payments, the level of debt, infl a-
tion and the GNP fi gures per capita. In the case of political 
risk, the main indicators are government and institutional 
 Table 4  Descriptive statistics of the cultural distance between Brazilian and foreign partners
Index of cultural distance
Mean = 1.74
Std dev. = 0.62
Min. = 0.22
Max. = 3.56
stability, the socio-economic situation, the level of corrup-
tion and the government’s attitude towards foreign direct 
investment. In order to accurately determine time-related 
variations of country risk and the impact of these varia-
tions on IJV survival, each score was introduced into the 
regression model in the form of a time-varying construct. 
The regression model used is known as Cox model with 
time-varying constructs. Thus the scores for economic risk 
and political risk were estimated for every year of the pe-
riod at risk (from 1974 to 2005).
Some control variables were introduced into the re-
gression model. They were selected because they are 
considered as determinants of IJV survival in the research 
literature. These are “longevity” (measuring the number 
of years between the date of creation and the end of the 
period at risk), the “number of partners”, the “contract 
amount” (measured in $US million) of IJVs, the two most 
frequent business activities – namely, “automotive” and 
“chemicals” – (measured by a dummy variable, 0-yes, 1-
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 Table 5  Descriptive statistics of control variables
Number of partners
Mean = 2.1
Std dev. = 0.3
Min. = 2
Max. = 4
Contract amount
($US million)
Mean = 165.5
Std dev. = 227.5
Min. = 50
Max. = 1,200
Business activity Joint Ventures %
Automotive
Yes
No
 28
157
17.0
83.0
Chemicals
Yes
No
 22
143
13.3
86.7
Total 165 100.0
Equity distribution Joint Ventures %
Unequal distribution
50/50
90
75
54.5
45.5
Total 165 100.0
no) observed in the sample, and the “equity distribution” 
between local and foreign partners (measured by a binary 
variable, 0-unequal ownership, 1-50/50 ownership). Ta-
ble 5  presents the descriptive statistics of the control 
variables.
4 TEST OF HYPOTHESES: HOW DO COUNTRY RISK AND NATIONAL CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTNERS AFFECT THE SURVIVAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
JOINT VENTURES IN BRAZIL?
Table 6  presents a correlation matrix. Excluding the 
strong correlations involving some independent variables 
(namely, “longevity”, “chemicals”, “cultural distance” and 
“economic risk”) and the survival variable, Table 5 shows 
that the highest correlation is between the IJV’s longevi-
ty and economic risk (r = 0.36 at p < 0.01). Apart from 
this observation, the correlation matrix does not raise any 
particular problems of colinearity between independent 
variables and control variables. The VIF (Variance Infl ation 
Factor) tests performed for each independent variable and 
control variable do not exceed 2, and they confi rm this 
absence of colinearity.
Table 7a  presents three Cox proportional hazards 
models associating a series of independent variables and 
control variables with the hazard rate of IJVs. The fi rst mo-
del (model 1) is reduced to only control variables. The se-
cond model (model 2) tests the impact of control variables 
and cultural distance on hazard rate. The third model (mo-
del 3) tests the impact of control variables and the effect of 
cultural distance and longevity interaction on hazard rate.
 Table 6  Correlation matrix
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Survival -
2. Longevity -0.31*** -
3. Number of partners -0.06 0.22*** -
4. Contract amount -0.01 0.11 0.12 -
5. Automotive 0.13* -0.05 0.07  0.02 -
6. Chemicals 0.18** 0.09 0.01  0.04 -0.18** -
7. Equity distribution -0.03 -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.02 -0.15* -0.1 -
8. Cultural distance 0.16** -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -
9. Economic risk a 0.4*** 0.36*** 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.2**  0.12 -
10. Political risk a 0.04 0.07 0.03  0.01 -0.01  0.03 -0.03 -0.13* 0.35***
a This variable corresponds to an average score of country risk over the entire period at risk.
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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The three models in Table 7a show a good fi t (at p < 
0.01). The analysis of coeffi cients of model 1 highlights 
three control variables that have a statistically signifi cant 
effect: the “automotive” and “chemicals” business activi-
ties and “equity distribution.” More precisely, it is found 
that the probability of survival of IJVs increases signifi -
cantly if they are in the automotive or chemicals business 
activities in Brazil. The signifi cant positive effect of equity 
distribution on hazard rate provides additional empirical 
validation to numerous studies, which showed that 50/50 
equity ownership is a destabilizing factor for joint ventu-
res (KILLING, 1983, GOMES-CASSERES, 1987, GERINGER; 
HEBERT, 1989, ZEIRA; SHENKAR, 1990). These studies 
associate 50/50 equity ownership with high joint venture 
instability: 50/50 equity ownership leads to confl icts and 
risks of paralysis in decision-making that are related to 
continuous negotiation between partners.
Model 2 identifi es a signifi cant positive impact of cul-
tural distance on hazard rate (at p < 0.1). In other words, 
the probability of survival of IJVs that have strong cultu-
ral distance between partners is lower than for those that 
have little or no national cultural differences. Therefore Hy-
pothesis 1 is validated.
In model 3, the cultural distance and longevity interac-
tion is signifi cant (at p < 0.01) and negative. This highli-
ghts the moderating role of the age of IJVs and supports 
Hypothesis 2: the more IJVs grow older and increase in 
maturity, the less they are likely to be affected and desta-
bilized by national cultural differences. Conversely, young 
IJVs, which are already subject to the liability of newness, 
are made particularly unstable by strong cultural distan-
ce. Nevertheless, this last fi nding must be qualifi ed in 
the light of Figure 2 , which shows a difference in the 
survival curves according to the level of cultural distance. 
According to Figure 2, it seems that the negative effect of 
cultural distance on young IJVs is not immediate. On the 
contrary, it is found that this effect is delayed and only 
arises from the fourth year. Table 7b  confi rms this in 
analyzing the impact of cultural distance on the probabili-
ty of IJV survival during a period at risk limited to the fi rst 
three years of existence: within this reduced period at risk, 
cultural distance has no signifi cant effect on hazard rate. 
Taken together, results in Tables 7a and 7b show that, whi-
le there is indeed an interaction effect of cultural distance 
and longevity of IJVs on hazard rate, this effect only starts 
during the fourth year and affect “young” joint ventures 
that have already some maturity.
Table 8  presents four Cox proportional hazards mo-
dels associating country risk variables and control varia-
bles with the hazard rate of IJVs. Country risk variables are 
analyzed in the four models as time-varying constructs. 
Models 1 and 3 test respectively the impact of economic 
risk and political risk on IJV survival. Models 2 and 4 test 
the interaction effect of the two country risk variables with 
cultural distance.
The four models in Table 8 show a good fi t (at p < 
0.01). Nevertheless, coeffi cients of economic risk and po-
litical risk (in models 1 and 3) are non-signifi cant. In other 
words, positive or negative variations of country risk do not 
affect the probability of survival of IJVs in Brazil. Therefore 
Hypothesis 3 is not validated. Models 2 and 4 highlight 
the existence of a single signifi cant interaction effect (at p 
< 0.1), which is that associating political risk and cultural 
distance: deterioration in political risk increases the insta-
bility of IJVs that are already subject to national cultural 
differences. Conversely, improvement of political risk mo-
derates the destabilizing effect of the cultural distance on 
IJV survival. These results partially support Hypothesis 4.
 Table 7a  Cox proportional hazards model, cultural distance and survival of joint ventures a, b
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Cultural distance 0.28 (0.19)*
Cultural distance x longevity -0.13 (0.02)***
Number of partners -0.43 (0.39) -0.4 (0.4) -0.36 (0.37)
Contract amount -0.34 (0.31) -0.34 (0.31) -0.26 (0.34)
Automotive 0.81 (0.35)** 0.72 (0.35)** 0.95 (0.35)***
Chemicals 0.99 (0.43)** 0.99 (0.43)** 0.89 (0.43)**
Equity distribution 0.44 (0.23)* 0.44 (0.23)* 0.25 (0.24)
2xLog-likelihood -716.03 -713.69 -653.29
Model chi-square 16.7*** 19.28*** 57.24***
N (terminated joint ventures) 165 (83) 165 (83) 165 (83)
a Positive coeffi cients indicate that increase in independent variable and control variable values increase the hazard rate of joint ventures, and conversely.
b Cell entries are coeffi cient estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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 Figure 2  Survival curves of international joint ventures in Brazil according to the level of cultural distance a
a The mean index of cultural distance (meanCD = 1.74) has been used to identify two levels of cultural distance in 
the sample of international joint ventures: “low cultural distance” and “high cultural distance.”
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 Table 7b  Cox proportional hazards model, cultural distance and survival
of joint ventures during the fi rst three years of the period at risk a, b
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Cultural distance 0.27 (0.25)
Number of partners -1.06 (0.96) -1.01 (0.96)
Contract amount -0.49 (0.47) -0.47 (0.47)
Automotive 0.66 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49)
Chemicals 0.81 (0.6) 0.79 (0.6)
Equity distribution 0.37 (0.32) 0.38 (0.32)
2xLog-likelihood -387.64 -386.44
Model chi-square 7.71 8.98
N (terminated joint ventures) 165 (40) 165 (40)
a Positive coeffi cients indicate that increase in independent variable and control variable values increase the hazard rate of joint ventures, and conversely.
b Cell entries are coeffi cient estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests)
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 Table 8  Cox proportional hazards model with time-varying constructs, cultural distance,
country risk and survival of joint ventures a, b
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Economic risk -0.99 (1.1)
Political risk 2.48 (3.71)
Economic risk x cultural distance 0.32 (0.35)
Political risk x cultural distance 0.82 (0.52)*
Number of partners -0.43 (0.39) -0.43 (0.39) -0.44 (0.39) -0.41 (0.4)
Contract amount -0.35 (0.31) -0.33 (0.3) -0.34 (0.31) -0.34 (0.31)
Automotive 0.79 (0.34)** 0.77 (0.35)** 0.8 (0.34)** 0.72 (0.35)**
Chemicals 1.01 (0.43)** 0.99 (0.43)** 0.98 (0.43)** 0.99 (0.43)**
Equity distribution 0.41 (0.24)* 0.45 (0.23)* 0.44 (0.23)* 0.43 (0.23)*
2xLog-likelihood -715.2 -715.2 -715.59 -713.47
Model chi-square 17.3*** 17.84*** 17.18*** 19.55***
N (terminated joint ventures) 165 (83) 165 (83) 165 (83) 165 (83)
a Positive coeffi cients indicate that increase in independent variable and control variable values increase the hazard rate of joint ventures, and conversely.
b Cell entries are coeffi cient estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests)
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to identify the individual 
and joint impact of two “country-level variables” (KOGUT; 
SINGH, 1988) – national cultural differences and country 
risk – on the survival of IJVs formed in an emerging coun-
try, Brazil. Some important fi ndings can be drawn from the 
different Cox proportional hazards models that have been 
performed in this article.
Firstly, taken individually, country-level variables in an 
emerging economy do not have a similar impact on IJVs 
survival: the “intercultural dynamics” makes it unstable, 
although its survival does not seem to be related to the 
emerging country’s “economic and political uncertainty” 
(YAN, 1998). Therefore national cultural differences and 
country risk are critical variables for IJVs, but they do not 
act in the same way or at the same time. Economic and po-
litical uncertainty is critical only at the time when the IJV is 
formed, because it is one of the main factors that infl uence 
the strategic choice of whether to enter an emerging coun-
try through acquisition, wholly-owned subsidiary or IJV. 
On the contrary to country risk variables, national cultural 
differences are found to be a determinant of IJV termina-
tion. These different results provide additional empirical 
validation of the culturalist approach and are consistent 
with prior studies that have reported a negative impact 
of cultural distance on IJV survival (LI; GUISINGER, 1991, 
BARKEMA; VERMEULEN, 1997, HENNART; ZENG, 2002).
Then, although it is supported by our empirical results, 
the culturalist approach to IJV survival must be qualifi ed 
because the intercultural dynamics has variable effects ac-
cording to the life cycle of IJVs, and it varies over time. 
Thus, during the very fi rst years, an IJV formed in an emer-
ging country does not seem to be affected by the degree 
of cultural distance that may exist between the local and 
foreign partners. During this fi rst stage in the life cycle of 
IJVs, the intercultural dynamics created by two distinct 
national cultures is real and observable, but it does not 
appear to produce cultural tensions or major confl icts. IJVs 
are subject to what Park and Russo (1996) and Hennart et 
al. (1998) called the “honeymoon effect”, which opposes 
and counters the negative effect of national cultural diffe-
rences and of liability of newness. However, this honeymo-
on effect is temporary, and it only delays the destabilizing 
effect of the cultural distance between partners. During a 
second stage in the life cycle, cultural distance produces its 
negative effect by causing cultural confl icts and ineffective 
communication between partners that often result in the 
dissolution of IJVs. During a third stage in the life cycle, 
“mature” IJVs with strong internal and external institu-
tionalization have become capable of absorbing cultural 
confl icts and, more generally, managing the intercultural 
dynamics. At this stage, the age of IJVs has its full effect, 
and it smoothes out national cultural differences.
Lastly, apart from the age of IJVs, another variable, 
country risk, moderates or amplifi es the impact of cultural 
distance on survival. The political dimension of country risk 
contributes to increasing the negative effect of cultural dis-
tance. When political risk deteriorates, resulting in the in-
troduction of measures to hinder foreign direct investment 
and/or an increase in government instability, this consti-
tutes “unanticipated events render the initial joint venture 
agreement quickly obsolete and require it to be renegotiated” 
(HENNART; ZENG, 2002: 701). In an organizational set-
ting with a strong cultural distance, this renegotiation of 
the position and role of local and foreign partners in the 
IJV is diffi cult to achieve between fi rms who communicate 
ineffectively and do not understand each other. In the end, 
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this often causes stalemate in negotiations and termina-
tion of the alliance.
This article has some limitations. A fi rst limitation is in 
the choice of Brazil as the context for analyzing IJVs for-
med in emerging countries. Every emerging country is spe-
cifi c and, even within a set of countries such as the BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), it is diffi cult to 
consider the economic, political and cultural situations in 
these countries as equivalent. The degree of “emergence” 
or transition varies greatly from one country to another. 
This must be borne in mind if one aims to generalize the 
above results and fi ndings to international joint ventures 
operating in emerging countries other than Brazil. In or-
der to overcome this limitation, it would be necessary to 
extend this research to other emerging countries in Latin 
America, and also in Asia and Eastern Europe. A second 
limitation is linked to the use of measurements of cultural 
distance and country risk that may fail to capture all the 
dimensions of these two multi-facetted concepts. Particu-
larly regarding country risk, more signifi cant results might 
be obtained by using fi ner measurements. Thus, empiri-
cal studies focusing on a precise facet of political risk – in 
this case, the changes in local regulations towards IJVs 
formed with foreign fi rms – have stressed the importance 
of this variable in analyzing the determinants of the survi-
val of international alliances in emerging countries (KALE; 
ANAND, 2001, PREVOT; MESCHI, 2006).
RC-USP_How do country .indd   106 5/7/2007   14:31:24
HOW DO COUNTRY RISK AND NATIONAL CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTNERS AFFECT THE SURVIVAL OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES ... 107
R. Cont. Fin. • USP • São Paulo • Edição 30 Anos de Doutorado • p. 96 - 107 • Junho 2007
NOTE - Address of the authors
Université de la Méditerranée 
58, Bd Charles Livon – 13284
Marseille Cedex 07 – France
University of São Paulo
School of Economics, 
Business Administration and Accountancy
Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908 
São Paulo – SP
05508-900
Kilmann R., Saxton M.J. & Serpa R. (1985), Gaining control of the corporate culture. Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Kalbfl eisch J.D. & Prentice R.L. (1980), The statistical analysis of failure time data. John Wiley.
Killing P. (1983), Strategies for joint venture success. Praeger Publishers.
Kogut B. (1988), « A Study of the Life Cycle of Joint Ventures », Management International Review, Vol. 28, n°4, pp. 39-52.
Kogut B. & Singh H. (1988), « The Effect of National Culture on the Choice of Entry Mode », Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 19, 
n°3, pp. 411-432.
Lee C. & Beamish, P.W. (1995), « The Characteristics and Performance of Korean Joint Ventures in LDCs », Journal of International Business 
Studies, Vol. 26, n°3, pp. 637-654.
Leung W.-F. (1997), « The Duration of International Joint Ventures and Foreign Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries », Applied Economics, Vol. 29, 
pp. 1255-1269.
Li J. & Guisinger S.E. (1991), « Comparative Business Failure of Foreign-Controlled Firms in the United States », Journal of International 
Business Studies, Vol. 22, n°2, pp. 209-224.
Meschi P.-X. (1997), « Longevity and Cultural Differences of International Joint Ventures: Toward a Time-based Cultural Management », 
Human Relations, Vol. 50, n°2, pp. 211-228.
Meschi P.-X. (2005), « Environmental Uncertainty and Survival of International Joint Ventures: The Case of Political and Economic Risk in 
Emerging Countries », European Management Review, Vol. 2, n°2, pp. 143-152.
Nahavandi A. & Malekzadeh A. (1988), « Acculturation in Mergers and Acquisitions », Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13, n°1, pp. 79-
90.
Nanda A. & Williamson P.J. (1995), « Use the Joint Ventures to Ease the Pain of Restructuring », Harvard Business Review, Vol. 73, n°6, pp. 119-
129.
Pan, Y. (1996). « Infl uences on foreign equity ownership level in joint ventures in China », Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 27, n°5, 
pp. 1-26.
Park S.H. & Russo M.V. (1996), « When Competition Eclipses Cooperation: An Event History Analysis of Joint Venture Failure », Management 
Science, Vol. 42, n°6, pp. 875-890.
Park S.H. & Ungson G. (1997), « The Effect of National Culture, Organizational Complementarity and Economic Motivation on Joint Venture 
Dissolution », Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 40, n°2, pp. 279-307.
Porter M.E. (1980), Competitive strategy. The Free Press.
Pothukuchi V., Damanpour F., Choi J., Chen C.C. & Park S.H. (2002), « National and Organizational Culture Differences and International 
Joint Venture Performance », Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 33, n°2, pp. 243-265.
Prevot F. & Meschi P.-X. (2006 forthcoming), « External Evolution Processes Affecting Joint Venture: The Case Study of a French-Brazilian Joint 
Venture in the Information Technology Sector », Thunderbird International Business Review, Vol. 44, n°2.
Rodriguez P., Uhlenbruck K. & Eden L. (2005), « Government Corruption and the Entry Strategies of Multinational », Academy of Management 
Review, Vol. 30, n°2, pp. 383-396.
Schaan J.-L. (1988), « How to Control a Joint Venture even as a Minority Partner », Journal of General Management, Vol. 14, n°1, pp. 4-18.
Scherer F.M. (1980), Industrial market structure and economic performance. Rand MacNally.
Scott R. (1995), Institutions and organizations. Sage.
Yan A. (1998) « Structural Stability and Reconfi guration of International Joint Ventures », Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 29, n°4, 
pp. 773-796.
Zaheer S. & Mosakowski E. (1997), « The Dynamics of the Liability of Foreignness: A Global Study of Survival in Financial Services », Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 18, n°6, pp. 439-464.
Zeira Y. & Shenkar O. (1990), « Interactive and Specifi c Parent Characteristics: Implications for Management and Human Resources in 
International Joint Ventures », Management International Review, Vol. 30, Special Issue, pp. 7-22.
RC-USP_How do country .indd   107 5/7/2007   14:31:28
